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AMIS    African Union Mission in the Sudan 
AU    African Union 
CAR    Central African Republic 
DIS    Détachment Intégré de Securité 
DPKO    Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
EUFOR   European Union Military Force 
GoC    Government of Chad 
GoS    Government of the Sudan 
IDP    Internally Displaced Person 
IOT    Integrated Operational Team 
UNHQ    United Nations Headquarters (New York, New York) 
MINURCAT   United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 
OAU    Organization of African Unity 
PBC    Peacebuilding Commission 
PKO    Peacekeeping Operation 
UNAMID   African Union/United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur 
UNEF I   First United Nations Emergency Force 
UNMEE   United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive Summary 
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The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has begun to face 
increasingly serious challenges to its missions in the form of withdrawn host state consent. As 
these situations bring to light the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the UN’s peacekeeping 
structure, it has become apparent that the Department must enact changes in its policies in order 
to prevent withdrawal of host state consent in future missions. 
 
Host state challenges to consent not only threaten the lives of UN peacekeepers and jeopardize 
the investment that Member States have chosen to make in the host state, but they also 
fundamentally endanger the legitimacy of United Nations peacekeeping as a security tool of the 
international community; without host state consent, UN missions would be engaging in peace 
enforcement rather than peacekeeping. This policy brief sets out the primary challenges faced in 
acquiring and maintaining host state consent. It is essential that the following issues be addressed 
by DPKO policies in order to avoid crises of consent in United Nations peacekeeping missions: 
• The failure to translate states’ official agreements into action on the ground due to a 
disconnect between the UN’s operational and strategic levels of interaction with the host 
state government; 
• A decrease in UN influence over the host country government as the peacekeeping 
operation (PKO) progresses in its mandate; 
• The sacrifice of key aspects of UN PKOs in order to acquire consent in instances of 
humanitarian necessity; and 
• The political nature of the mission’s interaction with the host state government and the 
subordinate position of the PKO to the host state in consent-based peacekeeping. 
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The above-stated obstacles are exhibited in three recent consent-based crises in the Sudan, Chad, 
and Eritrea. With these case studies in mind, this brief outlines the following policy 
recommendations that would strengthen DPKO’s capabilities for maintaining host state consent: 
• Explicitly stated incentives for host states’ cooperation and consent; 
• Supportive diplomatic structures to maintain the engagement and coordination of relevant 
actors and provide a unified front from which to demand continued consent; and 
• Detailed, realistic contingency planning for situations where consent-based issues are 
likely to occur. 
 
The United Nations and its Member States have an interest in ensuring that peacekeeping 
operations are not placed at the mercy of host state governments. As such DPKO must work 
towards ensuring that it has a range of strategies for situations where the withdrawal of host state 
consent is an obstacle to the successful continuation of a peacekeeping mission.  
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Introduction 
In recent years the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has 
experienced increasingly serious difficulties when it comes to sustaining the consent of the host 
state government for the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. Without changes in UN 
peacekeeping policies that seek to address the growing problem of withdrawn consent, UN 
peacekeeping operations (PKOs) will continue to face situations where peacekeepers are placed 
in harm’s way and missions are harassed, controlled, or expelled by uncooperative governments 
and thus fail to fulfill their mandates.  
 
This policy memo will lay out the following sections to explore the issue of host state consent for 
peacekeeping missions: 
• Section I: Necessary background information for understanding host state consent for 
peacekeeping missions; 
• Section II: Major obstacles faced by peacekeeping operations in gaining and maintaining 
consent for the mission; 
• Section III: Case studies of missions in the Sudan, Chad, and Eritrea to underline the 
importance of addressing primary challenges to maintaining consent; and 
• Section IV: Policy recommendations for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to 
address challenges to consent and increase the Department’s range of strategies for 
dealing with situations of withdrawn host state consent. 
 
The problem of withdrawn consent for peacekeeping missions poses difficulties not only for UN 
personnel on the ground, but also for United Nations peacekeeping as a player in the 
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international security arena. In light of recent consent-based withdrawals of peacekeeping 
missions, it has become clear that changes in UN peacekeeping policy must be made to ensure 
that the support and consent of the host state is maintained at an operational as well as a 
rhetorical level. The obstacles to consent that are exhibited by this paper’s case studies show the 
need for policies that will incentivize cooperation and connect the Security Council’s authority to 
the reality in the field. 
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Section I: Background 
United Nations peacekeeping operations are based on three basic principles: consent of the 
parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate. 
However, as peacekeeping missions are placed in more complex situations, the definitions of 
these principles have begun to be questioned and expanded. Within the issue of consent of the 
parties, the following concepts are crucial for a complete understanding of host state consent and 
the role it plays in UN peacekeeping missions: 
• Differences between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of consent; 
• The importance of host state consent as a tenet of UN peacekeeping operations and its 
crucial place in the functioning of peacekeeping missions on the ground; and 
• Recent shifts in the conceptualization of consent within DPKO that change how consent 
must be viewed in the formulation of missions and the analysis of past consent-based 
problems. 
 
Levels of Consent 
Consent for UN peacekeeping operations goes beyond a simple agreement with a host 
state that a mission can come onto their territory. There are typically three acknowledged levels 
of consent: the tactical level, the operational level, and the strategic level. This brief and its 
policy recommendations will address the two highest of these levels of consent, strategic and 
operational.  
The lowest level of consent, the tactical level, involves a local understanding of consent 
that takes into account population acceptance and the consent of important local actors.1 It is at 
                                                
1 Neil Fenton. Understanding the UN Security Council. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). 31. 
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this level that the consent of opposition groups or spoilers must be managed; the tactical level of 
consent moves beyond the traditional understanding of the state and takes into account real, 
tangible consent for ground-level peacekeeping forces. Policies and guidelines have been 
assembled to instruct the individual commander in the field on ways to gain and maintain 
consent in the general population, but the mission itself must take primary action when it comes 
to managing tactical consent as many groups who affect tactical consent do not have access to 
state-level structures.2 The DPKO’s 2008 document outlining the Department’s principles and 
guidelines, the “Capstone Doctrine,” addresses tactical consent by calling for “political and 
analytical skills, the operational resources, and the will to manage situations where there is an 
absence or breakdown of local consent.”3 This reflects the view of the Department that tactical 
consent is best dealt with at the ground level. 
A slightly higher level, the operational level, concerns the ability of the mission to plan 
and carry out its objectives within the area in which it has been placed.4 This involves the 
choices of the higher levels of leadership in the field and often involves coordination or 
cooperation with the host state itself at the mission level. Restrictions of operational consent may 
take the form of visa restrictions on UN staff, illegal taxation of the mission, or physical 
restrictions of the mission’s movement on the ground. This type of consent is differentiated from 
tactical consent both by the interaction of the mission with the host state government and by the 
effect that restrictions at this level have on the overall ability of the mission to carry out its 
mandate. 
                                                
2 D. Stuart Gordon and F. H. Toase. Introduction. Aspects of Peacekeeping. (London: Frank Cass, 2001). xxv. 
3 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Division of Policy, Evaluation, and Training, 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Section. “United Nations Peacekeeping Principles and Guidelines.” (United Nations: 
New York, 2008). 33. 
4 Ibid., 31. 
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The strategic, or formal, level is the highest level of consent for peacekeeping missions. 
At this level the Security Council decides on a mission’s mandate and takes into account 
“’macro’ factors affecting consent.”5 These may include the overall objectives of the mission, the 
roles played by outside actors, and the limits of the mission’s mandate. At the strategic level the 
host state expresses its rhetorical support for the force by agreeing to the deployment of a 
mission on its territory and Member State or UN diplomats may negotiate the mandate of the 
mission with host state government officials. It is these two highest levels, the operational and 
the strategic, where the intentions and restrictions of the host state are typically expressed. 
For the purposes of United Nations departmental policy, it is important to understand 
which actors have primary responsibility for consent at each level in order to focus policy change 
on aspects over which DPKO has real influence. While the management of tactical consent is 
vital for the work of a peacekeeping mission, it is also the level of consent at which the Security 
Council, Member States, and in many cases the host state itself, have little control. In some 
situations the host state may not have full territorial control, and consent must be managed 
directly with the population or with opposition or rebel groups. For this reason, expressions of 
host state dissatisfaction with a peacekeeping mission are rarely articulated, or at least are far 
harder to distinguish, at the tactical level. Conversely, opposition groups and local populations 
have no control over decision-making at the strategic level, the negotiation for which takes place 
in New York between Security Council members, Member State governments, and the 
Secretariat. The operational level of consent bridges the gap between the strategic and the 
tactical, but also tends to be state-dominated; operational difficulties are most often freedom of 
movement issues due to the host government’s restrictions on the activities of the mission rather 
than constraints imposed by a population or rebel group. The operational level, for the purposes 
                                                
5 Op. cit., Fenton, 32. 
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of this paper, is also identifiable by the relationship the mission on the ground maintains with the 
entity that negotiates at the strategic level. Operational consent will be understood to refer to the 
power of the state to follow up on or violate the agreements it makes at the strategic level, 
regardless of its territorial or political control within its own country. 
 
Importance of Consent in UN Peacekeeping 
The Brahimi Report of 2000 reinforced the importance of peacekeeping’s three principles 
in the aftermath of some of the most infamous failures and declared that “consent of the parties, 
impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense should remain the bedrock principles of 
peacekeeping.”6 Consent has implications for nearly all aspects of UN peacekeeping missions. 
Member States view their investment in peacekeeping missions as consent-based, host states 
view consent as the key to protection of their sovereignty, and when consent is withdrawn, it can 
be extremely dangerous for UN peacekeeping personnel to work within a nonconsensual 
environment. The necessity of state consent is the main identifier of a UN peacekeeping mission; 
without the consent of the host state, the UN would be participating in enforcement activity 
rather than peacekeeping.7 The DPKO “Capstone Doctrine” of 2008 is clear on the importance of 
this aspect of peacekeeping:  
The complete withdrawal of consent by one or more of the main parties 
challenges the rationale for the United Nations peacekeeping operation and will 
likely alter the core assumptions and parameters underpinning the international 
community’s strategy to support the peace process.8  
 
                                                
6 United Nations General Assembly. United Nations Security Council. Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations. A/55/305. S/2000/809. 21 August 2000. Heretofore referred to as “The Brahimi Report.” 
ix. 
7 Op. cit., “United Nations Peacekeeping Principles and Guidelines.” 34. 
8 Op. cit., “United Nations Peacekeeping Principles and Guidelines.” 32. 
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It is the understanding of consent as the primary source of peacekeeping’s legitimacy that gives 
it its importance and has reinforced the organizational respect for this concept, even as the 
implications of its primacy, and indeed its very definition, may have changed over time.  
Early interpretations of consent appeared to have been based purely on the official 
expression of support for the mission at the highest levels of state authority. The first 
peacekeeping mission in history, the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was 
terminated based on the host state’s withdrawal of support, but this mission did not experience 
the level of sustained operational restrictions that recent missions have encountered.9 UNEF I left 
Egypt after facing the withdrawal of strategic level consent and the movement of the Egyptian 
military into the UN’s observation posts; simultaneous withdrawal of both the strategic and the 
operational levels of consent by the state shows an interpretation of the two as intimately 
connected, a inclination that has not continued in DPKO’s most recent experiences of withdrawn 
consent. The above-quoted position of the Department seems to refer to the earlier understanding 
of consent; yet this recently published official position does not address the consequences for a 
mission’s credibility when consent is partially withdrawn, rather than part of a “complete 
withdrawal.”  
 
Changing Conceptualizations of Host State Consent within DPKO 
The conceptualization of host state consent has changed over the years not only 
seemingly from the point of view of the states themselves, but from within the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations as well. Although it is considered one of the tenets of United Nations 
peacekeeping, “consent of the parties” is by no means a static concept, and DPKO’s official 
                                                
9 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping. “First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I): Background.” 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html. 
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policy has begun to evolve in the aftermath of challenging missions like the ones that will be 
discussed later in this paper. 
The newest and most significant change in the conceptualization of consent for 
peacekeeping missions came out of the “Capstone Doctrine,” which sought to expand the 
understanding of consent beyond a rhetorical agreement to the physical presence of 
peacekeeping troops.10 While the Brahimi Report stressed the importance of peacekeeping as a 
supplement to a political process in 2000, DPKO has recently expanded that understanding to 
have implications for consent.11 The Department has come to understand consent for a 
peacekeeping mission to include not just an allowance of freedom of movement for the mission, 
but also the creation of political space for a PKO to act within the country.12 Therefore, DPKO 
has come to define consent in political as well as physical terms, establishing that host state 
consent can be withdrawn or fail to be given through either physical or political means. This 
view has been continued in the “New Horizon” non-paper, which stresses the importance of 
maintaining political support for the mission, not just in the general UN community, but also in 
the host country itself.13 
In “Managing Consent—the New Variable?” Ian Johnstone takes a largely state-oriented 
view of consent, as this paper will do, focusing more on the strategic and operational levels of 
consent and less on the tactical level, which the host state has more limited direct control over. 
Johnstone chooses to analyze consent from the viewpoint of relational contract theory, which is 
helpful in understanding the changing nature of consent, even if it may fall short in explaining 
                                                
10 As noted in Ian Johnstone, "Managing Consent- The New Variable?" Beyond the 'New Horizon' Proc. of UN 
Peacekeeping Future Challenges Seminar, Geneva. Ed. Cedric De Coning, Andreas Oien Stensland, and Thierry 
Tardy. 24 June 2010. 28-29. 
11 “The Brahimi Report,” 5., as well as United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Division of Policy, 
Evaluation, and Training, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section. “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New 
Horizon for Peacekeeping.” (United Nations: New York, 2009). 9. 
12 Op. cit., “United Nations Peacekeeping Principles and Guidelines.” 32. 
13 Op. cit., “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for Peacekeeping.” 12. 
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aspects of the connection between host state governments and the United Nations. Under 
relational contract theory, rather than a “one-off transaction,” Johnstone argues that the peace 
agreement forming the basis of consent is part of an ongoing relationship between the major 
actors and as such is subject to change and reinterpretation over time. This theory is founded on 
several assumptions: first, it assumes that both actors have a desire to continue the relationship; 
second, it sees the contract as a framework within which the terms of the agreement may change 
rather than a set list of unchanging expectations; third, it implicates other players beyond the two 
parties in the contract; and fourth, the entirety of the relationship between the actors must be 
understood to play a role in consent, taking into account power relations and changing 
circumstances.14  
Although Johnstone does not draw out the potential effects that consent through this 
framework may have on one’s interpretation of the Department’s changing view of consent, 
there are nevertheless important implications to be explored within this theory. The recent 
changes in the UN’s understanding of consent could reasonably be argued to be the result of 
changes in the terms of the agreement over the course of successive peacekeeping missions in 
many different countries. In the context of multiple peacekeeping “contracts,” the Department’s 
understanding of what host state consent looks like over time may have been shifted. A 
fundamental fact of these contracts which relational contract theory fails to account for in the 
relationship between the host state and the UN is that one of the parties remains constant over the 
course of many newly developed contracts; while the terms of each individual contract may 
change over time, it must also be recognized that the beginning terms of all contracts over time 
may also change as a result of lessons learned by the constant actor, in this case the UN and the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This is an important point in examining the most recent 
                                                
14 Op. cit. Johnstone. 29-30. 
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peacekeeping missions where consent-based issues have occurred. The change in the 
Department’s view of consent over time may have contributed to the rise of consent-based 
obstacles in UN peacekeeping missions. 
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Section II: Challenges to Maintaining Consent 
In order to propose policies that can effectively address the challenges of maintaining host state 
consent at both the operational and the strategic levels, it is first crucial to understand the major 
issues faced by missions. This section seeks to propose primary obstacles to consent with the aim 
of identifying the principal areas of concern for consent-based peacekeeping, as well as to 
expand and reframe some of the challenges that Johnstone discusses in his article “Managing 
Consent- the New Variable?” The challenges addressed in this paper include the following: 
1. Political and authoritative separation between the operational and the strategic levels of 
consent; 
2. The UN’s weakening authority and influence in the face of obsolescing will; 
3. Difficulty of consent-based peacekeeping in the context of complex humanitarian 
emergencies; and 
4. The highly political nature of the relationship between the host government and the 
mission on the ground. 
 
1.) Separation Between the Operational and Strategic Levels of Consent 
Often in UN peacekeeping there is a failure to translate official agreement at the strategic 
level into concrete action on the ground. This appears to be due to a disconnect between these 
two levels. Although the actors remain the same at the strategic and the operational levels, it is 
misleading to believe that the relationship between the host state and the United Nations also 
remains the same. Johnstone’s relational contract theory fails to expand to the strategic and 
operational levels unless these two levels are combined into one understanding of the 
relationship between the host state and the United Nations. But this view misses a crucial point, 
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which is that the relationship that the host state shares with the United Nations at the strategic 
level is very different from that which it experiences at the operational level. Relational contract 
theory takes into account “the context of the overall relationship (including the power 
dynamics)” in order to understand the nature of its consent.15 This provides a good model for 
understanding consent given at the strategic level, but falls short by losing sight of the distinctly 
different dynamics at the operational level and the play between the two. At the strategic level, 
the host state may be pressured diplomatically from many sides and find itself functioning within 
the normative structure of UNHQ with few allies who are willing to assist in asserting its 
sovereignty. The power dynamic in this instance is very much in favor of the Security Council, 
its individual Member States, and the Secretariat. In the field at the operational level, however, 
this power dynamic changes drastically. The mission on the ground is at the mercy of the host 
government when it comes to basic essentials like delivery of supplies and granting of visas. The 
issue becomes considerably more complex in situations where the host state government is 
unhappy about giving its consent at the strategic level and sees its relative power the operational 
level as its outlet for frustration. As the study of UNMEE in Eritrea will show, the operational 
level of activity leaves the mission very much at the mercy of the host state, regardless of the 
power dynamic at play in New York.  
The disconnect between the operational and the strategic and the drastic difference in 
power dynamics between the two allows for cases where the host state promises one thing under 
the watchful gaze of the Security Council in New York and then proceeds to act completely in 
opposition to that promise to the Security Council’s peacekeeping mission on its territory. 
Though this may seem a straightforward problem, the failure of the Security Council’s authority 
to influence the host state’s actions on the ground is a major obstacle to maintaining overall 
                                                
15 Op. cit., Johnstone, 30. 
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consent, especially if consent was unwillingly given at the strategic level. The “Capstone 
Doctrine” asserts that “consent, particularly if given grudgingly under international pressure, 
may be withdrawn in a variety of ways when a party is not fully committed to the peace 
process.”16 Inevitably, the withdrawal in these cases happens at the operational level with few 
consequences at the strategic level. Though the mission has the full backing of the Security 
Council, it is difficult for it to assert this over a more powerful host state. 
 
2.) UN Influence In the Face of “Obsolescing Will”17 
United Nations peacekeeping missions are most often placed in situations where a 
government is weak and needs international support in order to sustain its peace process, its grip 
on the security situation, or the development of its institutional structure. If a peacekeeping 
mission is successful at its aims, the result will be a stronger and more capable state. In this 
context, Johnstone discusses the phenomenon of what he terms “obsolescing will.” He sees 
peacekeeping as a “bargain” between the elites of a country and the United Nations.18 Early on, 
the government desperately needs the support of the United Nations, and the resources and 
credibility that it can bring to early stages of the peace process are highly desirable. As the 
process progresses, however, the comparative strength of the government increases and the 
influence of the UN decreases. This leads to an “obsolescing will,” as the government begins to 
see less of a role for the UN and is able to assert itself more strongly in its own internal matters.19  
The main effect of obsolescing will is that incentives for cooperation and consent lose 
their power over time. As the UN helps build the capacity of the state, it simultaneously reduces 
                                                
16 “Principles and Guidelines.” 32. 
17 Op. cit., Johnstone, 32. 
18 Ibid., 31. 
19 Ibid., 31-32. 
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its own leverage and its own welcome within that state.20 The bottom line for this phenomenon is 
that strong states are less likely to be tolerant of UN peacekeeping missions on their territory 
whereas weaker states do not have the capacity to object to a UN presence, much less handle 
their own security or development problems. An understanding of this bottom line is crucial 
when developing policies for maintaining consent, as the beginning strength of the state will 
determine whether consent-related issues are likely to be an early factor. States which start out 
strong even before a peacekeeping operation is in place are more likely to challenge the mission 
early and assertively. The UN must have a way to address this obstacle by establishing strategies 
for maintaining its leverage over the host state even in cases where consent-based issues arise 
early in the mission’s lifetime.21 
 
3.) Consent-Based Peacekeeping in Humanitarian Emergencies 
While consent is one of the central tenets of peacekeeping, the dogged pursuit of host 
state agreement can compromise the nature of the entire mission, if not challenge the credibility 
of the whole of UN peacekeeping.22 In cases where there is the perception of a moral imperative, 
UN peacekeeping may be asked to sacrifice vital aspects of the operation, including operational 
control or a meaningful role in political processes, in order to secure the consent of the host state. 
However, in light of DPKO’s relatively new understanding of consent as being both political and 
physical, missions under these circumstances call into question whether a peacekeeping mission 
can be considered to have been given consent at the strategic level if the UN is cut out of the 
political process. It becomes important that the nature of the mission be understood in relation to 
the consent that has been given in order to determine whether the mission is carrying out a true 
                                                
20 Op. cit. Johnstone, 32. 
21 Ibid., 33. 
22 Ibid., 35. 
Beck 19 
peacekeeping operation or is merely a vehicle to respond to a humanitarian emergency. The 
example of Darfur will showcase this point clearly. 
From Johnstone’s point of view, this issue could be placed under the heading of what he 
terms as “uncertainty about the core business of peacekeeping.”23 He argues that the role of 
peacekeepers is both too ambitious and too unclear; PKOs are asked to do everything from “rule 
of law” to “security,” while it remains unclear whether or not the capacity exists for completing 
any of these lofty goals.24 This “ambitious vision for peacekeeping”25 appears to be at play in 
negotiations for peacekeepers in humanitarian emergencies. The sacrifice of vital aspects of 
control of the mission’s structure in order to solidify consent speaks to the belief that the simple 
existence of peacekeepers achieves something significant and transformative to the environment 
in which it is placed. But to temper this conviction could produce ramifications for peacekeeping 
missions, as Johnstone observes:  
The implications for managing consent are profound, and in fact cut both ways. 
On the one hand, it is easier to sustain genuine consent for minimal goals. Fewer 
interlocutors need to be engaged and the leverage of outsiders can be targeted. On 
the other hand, consent to a minimalist intervention may not provide sufficient 
reassurance to all stakeholders.26 
 
In other words, some of the power of peacekeeping missions, especially in the case of 
humanitarian emergencies, is the symbolic support it provides to the other parties involved. 
However, counting on this fact to produce concrete results in the face of a restrictive government 
is not an effective long-term strategy. Ultimately, each peacekeeping operation is individually 
negotiated with the host state; humanitarian emergencies place pressure on the structure of 
consent-based peacekeeping because they may build in structures that challenge the 
                                                
23 Op. cit. Johnstone, 30. 
24 Ibid., 30. 
25 Ibid., 31. 
26 Ibid., 31. 
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independence of the mission and allow consent to be used as a tool of the government. The case 
of Darfur will showcase this issue clearly.  
 
4.) Political Involvement of the Mission on the Ground 
The nature of consent-based peacekeeping is such that UN PKOs must maintain a careful 
balance in their interactions with the host governments. Although PKOs must cooperate with the 
government of the host state and at times need to placate it in order to maintain consent for the 
mission, they must also maintain distance from the government so that they are not too deeply 
influenced by its needs or desires. Johnstone pinpoints the difficulties faced by missions that 
become too closely aligned with the government. He argues that the mission becomes subject to 
“obstructionism” on the part of the host state if it becomes too involved.27 By reducing its 
independence from the government, the mission may be pressured to give into state demands or 
to reinterpret its mandate in such a way as to benefit the host government. To directly oppose the 
government, however, is to risk consent that may have been unwillingly given in the first place.28 
If the mission is confrontational or unwilling to compromise to government demands, they may 
endanger the mandate—at the end of the day, the host government has the power to withdraw its 
consent. 
The nature of a mission’s involvement on the ground also has implications for the 
understanding of consent-based peacekeeping. The “Capstone Doctrine” makes it clear that its 
own understanding of consent reflects not just a state’s acceptance of a peacekeeping mission’s 
physical deployment on its territory, but also that the mission is allowed a meaningful and 
                                                
27 Op. cit., Johnstone, 35. 
28 Ibid., 35. 
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legitimate role in the political process.29 This understanding could lead us to conclude that in 
cases where a viable political process is not in order, consent for a peacekeeping mission has not 
or indeed cannot be given. Realistically, however, the Security Council does not always take this 
aspect of consent into account and missions are placed in situations where political involvement 
is minimal or heavily restricted. The cases of Chad and Darfur will highlight the need for 
practical strategies even in situations where the Department’s full definition of consent is not 
met. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
29 Op. cit., “United Nations Peacekeeping Principles and Guidelines.” 32.  
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Section III: Case Studies 
The restrictive nature of the above-stated challenges is best understood in the context of real-life 
situations faced by missions in the field. The following case studies show the complexity of 
maintaining the consent of the host state once a mission is on the ground and the host state has 
control over its operational freedoms. This section will explore three case studies that highlight 
challenges faced by PKOs: 
• African Union/United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)- In a rush to 
attend to the humanitarian catastrophe occurring in Darfur, the UN was forced to accept 
the terms set by the Sudanese government despite the drastic changes to the nature of the 
peacekeeping mission. The hybrid formation of the Mission reduced the UN’s control 
over its own operational choices on the ground, thus setting a precedent for control by the 
Government of the Sudan and reducing its ability to advocate for operational freedoms. 
The political space for UNAMID was limited at best and continues to be less than 
meaningful. At the strategic level, relations have been complicated by the Government’s 
denial of the scale of the humanitarian disaster on its territory.  
• United Nations Mission to the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)- 
The power relationship between the host state and the United Nations differed sharply 
from the strategic to the operational level; this led to a strict assertion of control by the 
host state at the operational level. The Mission’s close relationship with the Chadian 
government at the ground level restricted its ability to advocate for its own freedom of 
movement and compromised the set-up and mandate of the Mission. This operation’s 
experience could be considered as a worst-case scenario, as the Mission was restricted 
politically to the extent that it was unable to make any meaningful change in the security 
Beck 23 
situation of eastern Chad before it was explicitly asked to leave by the host government at 
the strategic level. 
• United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)- The slow and steady 
restriction of the operational freedom of the Mission by the Eritrean government led to its 
eventual withdrawal and termination, even in the face of government insistence that the 
restrictions on the Mission were a “technical issue.” The inability of the UN to turn 
strategic-level discussions into concrete improvements for the Mission’s freedom of 
movement at the operational level ended in what many in DPKO refer to as “death by a 
thousand cuts” for UNMEE and the ultimate failure of the operation. This case highlights 
the importance of operational consent and the sometimes-meaningless effect of strategic-
level rhetoric. 
 
Case Study 1: Darfur and UNAMID 
Background 
The violence in Darfur, Sudan garnered high-profile media attention and a worldwide 
outcry for action beginning in 2004. The Government of the Sudan (GoS) and its Janjaweed 
militia were carrying out attacks in the western part of the country, targeting whole villages of 
people in what appeared to be, but for some time was not labeled as, a genocidal campaign.30 
The UN first began exploring the possibility of establishing some kind of UN operation in Darfur 
in early 2004.31 This was followed by a Security Council resolution supporting the deployment 
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of an African Union protection force in July 2004 and the African Union’s decision to take 
primary responsibility for the international community’s diplomatic action in Darfur32 during the 
UN’s preparations for a peacekeeping mission between North and South Sudan.33 The AU force 
in Darfur, also know as the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), began to be 
intentionally targeted not long after it had established itself on the ground as the parties to the 
new peace agreement, most notably the Government of Sudan, failed to live up to the promises 
made in the agreement.34 
The agreement that would lead to the establishment of UNAMID, the African 
Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur, was completed in 2007 after extensive 
negotiations with the GoS and three years of struggle for AMIS. From the beginning, President 
al-Bashir insisted, “in strong terms,” that a transition from an AU-led to a UN-led mission was 
unacceptable.35 His disapproval of outside forces was felt by AMIS: 
In addition to the obstruction of its activities by the parties [to the Darfur Peace 
Agreement], including the imposition of a crippling curfew and other restrictions 
by the Government and active hostility on the part of some rebel groups, AMIS 
has been grappling with major challenges, including insufficient mobility, 
communications, and public information capabilities.36 
 
The inability of AMIS to effect change or enforce a peace agreement if one were agreed to 
seemed for the GoS to make it a more acceptable alternative to a UN mission, though it still 
suffered from the operational constraints that would ultimately plague UNAMID as well. Despite 
early refusal of consent for a hybrid mission, further high-level meetings with the permanent 
members of the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the European Union and the League of 
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Arab States, among others, finally led to the GoS’s consent for a hybrid mission in Darfur.37 The 
formulation of the mission, however, had changed within the negotiations. Rather than 
establishing a United Nations mission in place of AMIS, which it knew would be far more 
effective, the GoS insisted on splitting the difference and creating a hybrid mission. 
 Despite the new and improved nature of the international mission, UNAMID did not 
enter Darfur with fewer operational restrictions than AMIS had faced.  In fact, the extent of the 
GoS’s operational constraints only increased with UNAMID’s deployment. The requirement for 
the Mission to have “a predominantly African character”38 was especially problematic. The 
initial deployments of troops were delayed because, “the Government…expressed reservations 
about certain non-African units in the force, including the infantry battalion from Thailand, the 
force reserve/special forces and sector reserve companies from Nepal and the Nordic engineering 
company.”39 The GoS was explicit about its use of consent in order to secure material gains from 
the United Nations. It agreed to allow night flying, “on the condition that the United Nations 
would upgrade its airports in Darfur.”40 The operational restrictions placed on UNAMID 
continued, including limitations on patrols, delays by the GoS in moving UN equipment through 
customs, and intentionally-slow visa granting for UN personnel.41 Mission constraints have not 
yet ceased as UNAMID heads into its fourth year on the ground. The latest Secretary-General’s 
report of 18 January 2011 details these now-typical restrictions: 
Government restriction on the movement of UNAMID constrained the mission’s 
response to the affected population in the first days of the [most recent] crisis. Air 
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and land restrictions were in force in Khor Abeche, Shaeria, Muhajeria, Labado, 
Marla, Shangil Tobaya and Dar al Salam. The Government lifted some 
restrictions on 27 December, but continued to limit the mission’s movement... 
The mission’s freedom of movement was impeded on 26 occasions during the 
reporting period, bringing the total for the year to 123. Of the incidents during the 
reporting period, 23 restrictions were imposed by Government of the Sudan 
authorities.42 
 
For UNAMID, constraints on its movement and other operational activities have become the 
norm. Although it still manages to function, it is questionable how effective the Mission is able 
to be when fundamental aspects of its functionality, like area patrol, can be blocked at the 
Government’s whim. 
 
Analysis of Consent in Darfur 
UNAMID, as the only still-active mission discussed here, has clearly not yet hit its limit 
for operational restriction as this paper will discuss for another mission before it. And the 
operational constraints placed on UNAMID have not been so extreme as to drive the Mission 
from Darfur. Within the context of the humanitarian emergency that is Darfur, there is little 
doubt that the Mission is able to accomplish enough, in spite of constraint, to change the quality 
of life for many in the area by facilitating humanitarian aid and contributing, however little it 
can, to stability in the region. But regardless of its ability to carry out the basics of its operational 
plan, the consistent and long-standing restrictions that have been placed on UNAMID set a 
dangerous precedent. The high-profile nature of the violence in Darfur exerted pressure on the 
UN to be seen as an actor in attempting to stop it. The need for some kind of humanitarian 
response over and above that provided by AMIS appeared to trump many of the other needs of a 
peacekeeping mission and forced the UN to agree to the deployment of a mission that was deeply 
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flawed. Despite the AU’s early action in Darfur, a hybrid mission was not the best-case scenario 
for the situation in Darfur, and the GoS appeared to know this from the start. The use of the 
AU’s leading role as a rationale for calling for a predominantly African mission allowed the GoS 
to tie its consent to and control some of the most basic aspects of the Mission, such as the 
deployment of individual battalions of soldiers. In this case, the GoS was able to use the UN’s 
need for consent and its deep desire for a humanitarian response as leverage to challenge the 
formulation of UNAMID. Had the UN been slightly less eager to establish a new mission to deal 
with Darfur’s humanitarian situation, it might not have been put in a position that allowed the 
GoS to exert such power over its operations.  
In contrast to many governments that the UN deals with in negotiating peacekeeping 
operations, the GoS was a strong and assertive presence as well as being both the cause of and 
solution to the violence in Darfur. Johnstone discusses the UN’s loss of influence with the host 
state over time and asserts that “as the government becomes stronger, it becomes less tolerant of 
international tutelage – content to accept a small peacebuilding presence if that means greater 
economic aid, but less interested in a military presence and governance advice.”43 Unlike many 
host state governments, the GoS was not suffering from a lack of territorial control or influence 
within its country; indeed, the nature of the conflict in Darfur was a testament to the ability of 
officials in Khartoum to extend their support to militias far from the capital. Because of the 
strength of the GoS from the beginning of this, the “obsolescence of will” in the Sudan began 
before the UN had placed even one soldier on the ground in Darfur. It was apparent far ahead of 
time that support for international assistance was low and UN influence over the Government 
would be minimal. In light of the GoS’s tactics prior to the deployment of UNAMID and during 
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the deployment of AMIS, DPKO should have been able to anticipate and prepare for the 
problems it began to face once the Mission was established. Though the GoS has not yet 
expressed a desire for UN withdrawal at the strategic level, it is hard to argue that the Mission 
has been given either political consent or the operational space needed to fulfill its mandate.  
A continuation of UNAMID under these conditions has significant implications not only 
for the ongoing crisis in Darfur, but also for the way that other host states view consent and their 
own power over the operational aspects of UN peacekeeping missions. Darfur is a classic 
example of a state asserting itself at the operational level just enough to restrict the efficacy of 
the mission but not enough to receive punishment or censure at the strategic level. It should be of 
major concern that other states could find this to be a consent-based success story and seek to 
emulate the Sudan’s tactics on other UN missions. 
 
Case Study 2: Chad and MINURCAT 
Background 
MINURCAT was established in the context of the crisis in Darfur and the media frenzy 
that led also to the establishment of UNAMID. Refugee flows from Darfur into Chad and the 
Central African Republic (CAR) were reaching overwhelming numbers and the humanitarian 
situations in those areas had become dire. However, the situation in Darfur only partially 
explained the crisis that had developed in eastern Chad. Not only did the Chadian government 
maintain an ongoing armed conflict with rebel groups in its territory, but at the time of 
MINURCAT’s creation Chad was also in regular conflict with the Sudan.44 Both Chad and the 
Sudan were sponsoring each other’s opposition groups, who often then found shelter (as well as 
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recruits) in the refugee camps along the Chad-Sudan border. Combined with the refugee flows 
from Darfur and Chad’s own internally displaced persons (IDPs), this made for a serious 
humanitarian and security problem.45 
MINURCAT’s mandate was problematic from the beginning. DPKO was firm that the 
conditions for a peacekeeping mission did not exist in Chad, yet the Council continued to push 
until the Department was forced to develop a limited plan for providing security to the refugee 
and IDP camps. The Chadian government agreed to and was in support of the deployment of an 
international presence but was uncomfortable agreeing to a true military presence on its 
territory.46 Persistent diplomacy by the French, however, secured an agreement with the 
Chadians about a European military presence within the mission rather than a fully UN-led 
operation.47 A subsequent agreement replaced the European Union military forces (EUFOR) 
with a United Nations military force after one year.48 The Government of Chad (GoC) was 
unhappy with the subsequent turnover to UN military forces and remained vocal about its 
displeasure up until the moment it asked MINURCAT to leave.  
A major aspect of the mission in Chad was the formulation of a new police force, the  
Détachment Intégré de Securité (DIS). This GoC-led initiative intended to put together a 
Chadian police force to provide security for the refugee camps and surrounding areas in place of 
a United Nations police force but trained and overseen by UN personnel.49 In context, the end 
result of the DIS on the security situation was positive. However, the ultimate control of DIS 
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remained with the Chadians rather than the Mission itself. Payment for DIS equipment, vehicles, 
and other needs came from a specially developed trust fund, rather than from the Mission’s own 
budget. This fund allowed the DIS to demand equipment over and above what would be 
necessary to a police force, to the point that it was requiring $17.3 million in operating costs just 
for the year 2010—for a total force of less than 1,000 officers.50  
The GoC’s operational limitations of the Mission were subtle and largely unreported. Not 
only did it impose illegal taxes on MINURCAT,51 but it also restricted its ability to build up its 
military force through air movement restrictions at the main airport.52 However, due to the close 
relationship between high-level leadership in the Mission and the GoC, many of the restrictions 
imposed by the Government were unreported to UNHQ and are not reflected in official 
documentation of the Mission. Not long after the transfer of authority from EUFOR to the UN, 
the GoC requested at the strategic level that MINURCAT withdraw.  
The Mission, established in 2007, was asked to leave Chad in January 2010 and after 
negotiations with the GoC agreed to withdraw by December 31, 2010, enabling the mission to 
finish out the year.53 The GoC agreed to allow the extension beyond its original March 31st 
request for withdrawal in exchange for several material gains, namely the construction of airfield 
and road projects by the UN that would then be handed over to the Government upon the 
Mission’s departure. MINURCAT withdrew on time and was terminated. 
 
                                                
50 United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations  
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. S/2010/529. (14 October 2010). 5. 
51 United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations  
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. S/2009/535. (14 October 2009). 10-11. 
52 United Nations Security Council. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations  
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. S/2009/199. (14 April 2009). 7. 
53 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1923 (2010). S/RES/1923 (2010). (25 May 2010). 
Beck 31 
Analysis of Consent in Chad  
One of the identifying factors of the mission in Chad was the disturbingly close 
relationship between high-level Mission leadership and officials in the Chadian government. 
These close ties restricted the ability of the Mission to accomplish goals that were at all 
unpalatable to the Chadians, and this not only compromised many aspects of MINURCAT’s 
mandate, but also led to a breakdown in communication between the Mission and UNHQ as 
leadership in MINURCAT attempted to conceal the restrictive and coercive actions of the GoC 
from New York officials. This breakdown played a part in furthering the disconnect between the 
strategic and operational levels; not only had there been an initial miscommunication on the 
formulation of the mission, with the Chadians believing that they were requesting a purely 
civilian, not military, force,54 but there was also a clear break in the information held by 
operational-level Mission personnel and strategic-level personnel once MINURCAT began 
operating on the ground. 
While freedom of movement restrictions may have been intermittent or manageable 
issues, the ultimate constraint placed on the mission was that of its political sterility. 
MINURCAT had no political mandate and this led it to grasp at any possible opportunity to work 
with the GoC. Though there was an excess of frozen political processes contributing to the 
instability of Eastern Chad, the Mission was unable to participate in any of them; negotiations 
with the Sudanese government, peace talks in Darfur, and internal Chadian peace processes were 
all off limits for MINURCAT while having significant implications for the security situation it 
was mandated to stabilize. This led to a desire by the Mission to please the Government in order 
to be included in any process. Sadly, this close relationship ended in little more than Chad’s 
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withdrawn consent and a general recognition, especially in UNHQ, that MINURCAT was 
ultimately a failure.  
The United Nations’ ability to extract an extension of the Mission’s mandate in 2010 
even after the Government of Chad’s explicit withdrawal of consent has been seen by some as a 
success story of UN leverage on an unfriendly host state government in order to retain and 
extend consent.55 However, in this context the agreement to trade consent for airline hangars 
represented the last in a long line of concessions made by the Mission in order to placate the 
Chadian Government and avoid further negative feelings towards MINURCAT and the United 
Nations. The close relationship between the high-level Mission leadership and the Chadian 
Government suggests that the UN’s “leverage” in this instance may have been the result of 
Chadian pressure and control on the Mission rather than the other way around. Instead of 
offering benefits like infrastructure projects and airport aprons as incentives for sustained 
cooperation and consent, these features of the Mission were neglected56 until they had to be 
offered up as bribes when the GoC began to request the removal of MINURCAT. The UN was 
caught in a classic trap: rather than reinforcing cooperation, it was instead caught rewarding the 
Chadians’ bad behavior and unwillingness to work with the Mission with no additional freedoms 
in return, and was finally kicked out with little to show for its efforts and time.  
 
Case Study 3: Eritrea and UNMEE 
Background 
While the peacekeeping operations in Chad and Darfur were multidimensional 
peacekeeping missions with complex mandates in the context of complicated internal conflicts, 
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the mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea was not intended to be much beyond a traditional 
peacekeeping mission. Fighting broke out in May 1998 over a contested border following 
increased tensions between the two countries for several years.57 The border, vaguely demarcated 
by Italian colonizers in the late 1800s, was never fully established when Eritrea gained 
independence in 1993, a fact which aggravated the Eritrean government progressively more as 
time went on.58 In concert with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations 
pursued an agreement to end what was becoming “an extremely bloody campaign”59 between 
Ethiopian and Eritrean forces and signed on to the establishment of a peacekeeping mission to 
separate the two sides, demarcate a border, and oversee an Eritrean withdrawal in the contested 
areas.60 
In light of the failures of the 1990s, UNMEE was seen as a return to the “good old days” 
of peacekeeping. Early reviews of the mission contrasted it with peacekeeping failures in 
Somalia, describing UNMEE enthusiastically as “a model of traditional ‘Hammarskjöldian’ 
interposition,”61 despite recognizing that interstate conflict had become an increasingly rare style 
of conflict.62 Consent for the mission appeared to be uniform; in fact, the government of Eritrea 
was said to prefer UN involvement over that of the OAU,63 an ironic point in view of what was 
to come for UNMEE.  
Despite the early optimism, UNMEE began encountering problems before it could even 
establish an area of operations. The mandate wasn’t a year old before Eritrea had refused to fully 
withdraw its forces from the UN-created Temporary Security Zone, leaving an “authority 
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vacuum” in the area and endangering the peace- and confidence-building processes.64 UNMEE 
was struggling with freedom of movement difficulties from the beginning as well; this became a 
theme as the Mission progressed. In January of 2008, six months before the eventual termination 
of UNMEE, the Secretary-General’s Report counted 45 different “permanent” restrictions on the 
Mission’s freedom of movement that ranged from ending night patrols to expelling UN workers 
who were nationals of Western countries.65 The most serious of these restrictions began in late 
2005, when Eritrea restricted UNMEE from flying its helicopters, creating serious problems not 
only for patrol and oversight, but also for the Mission’s basic medical evacuation capabilities.66 
This process of constraint progressed to include curtailment of fuel shipments to the Mission, 
eventually leading to a complete cessation of fuel from Eritrean sources in late 2007.67  
The fuel stoppage was the final nail in UNMEE’s coffin, but not the last word from the 
Eritreans. As UNMEE attempted to withdraw itself from the Eritrean side of the Temporary 
Security Zone into Ethiopia, the Eritrean Defense Force blocked UN trucks, claiming that the 
movement across the border was a “unilateral decision” by the UN and as such had not been 
approved.68 At this point, shipments of food to the Mission were also halted though some 
contingents of peacekeepers had only two days of rations.69 Not long afterwards, the Mission 
was terminated completely for being unable to make any meaningful operational progress 
towards fulfilling the mandate in the face of the Government’s interference. 
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Analysis of Consent in Eritrea 
The Eritrean Government never formally withdrew its consent for the Mission. Even in 
the face of fuel and food stoppages, the Eritreans insisted that it was simply a bureaucratic issue 
that had yet to be resolved.70 This is the most clear-cut case of what DPKO refers to as “death by 
a thousand cuts” that the United Nations has ever seen, and it proves that consent-based issues 
are not a product only of multidimensional missions such as those previously discussed. 
Operational consent for UNMEE was slowly and methodically withdrawn while the Government 
insisted on its strategic support for the Mission and maintained that it was cooperating. Despite 
the Government’s rhetorical support, UNMEE and the Security Council were forced to accept 
the practical lack of consent on the part of the Eritrean Government, and the Mission’s mandate 
was terminated without success. 
In its entirety, Eritrea’s withdrawal of operational consent showcases the disconnect 
between the strategic and operational levels of consent and the utter lack of consequence for 
increasing, small-scale restrictions of the Mission. Simple activities such as conducting patrols 
were limited by the Government with no reproof from the Mission. These issues could not be 
addressed because there was little tie between the rhetorical and the operational levels of 
consent. The Eritrean government found that it could hold off the UN and still restrict the 
Mission simply by calling the years-long constraints “a technical matter.”71 Their rhetoric at the 
strategic level was matched by equally meaningless rhetoric in the Security Council as it 
“reiterat[ed] its demands” that Eritrea cooperate with the Mission and cease its trifling in mission 
operability.72 
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At a basic level, UNMEE’s experiences highlight the power of the host state over the 
most elementary requirements of a mission. It is difficult to identify similarities between the 
power dynamic at UNHQ and in the field when a host state has nearly complete control over 
such basic resources as the mission’s food supply. This may simply be a fact of peacekeeping 
missions that is unlikely to change, but it highlights the separation between the strategic and the 
operational levels of consent and stresses the need for strategies to deal with these issues. 
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Section IV: Policy Recommendations 
It is a reality of United Nations peacekeeping that missions will not always be placed in 
situations where genuine consent exists. With this fact in mind, the policies to be adopted by 
DPKO for maintaining consent for a peacekeeping mission must recognize two essential facts:  
 First, peacekeeping policies must apply to the worst- as well as the best-case scenarios 
for state consent. That is, the Department must have strategies not only for avoiding 
situations where consent is likely to be withdrawn, but also for managing a mission that is 
operating in sub-optimal circumstances.  
 Second, policies must recognize that consent-based issues have appeared to react to 
precedent; issues regarding consent have appeared fairly recently after high-profile cases 
of successful strong-arming of peacekeeping missions. This means that DPKO must be 
able to apply its polices in a uniform manner to avoid allowing exceptions that could be 
copied by host states of future missions. 
 
The following policy recommendations attempt to address the primary obstacles to genuine 
consent as evinced by the discussed case studies by suggesting strategies that would enable the 
UN to assert leverage over the host state government and allow for an activism on the part of 
DPKO that has been missing to date: 
• Recommendation 1: The Department of Peacekeeping Operations must present explicit 
incentives for cooperation and consent rather than approach the host state with these 
options once it has already placed restrictions on the mission. This will enable the UN to 
reward the host state for good behavior and have a list of desirable projects that it can cut 
as a disincentive for restrictive behavior. 
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• Recommendation 2: The Department must institutionalize its use of groups of interested 
actors to exert pressure on host state governments and decrease the effects of obsolescing 
will. Ongoing diplomacy throughout the lifetime of the mission will keep important 
players involved and restrict the ability of the host state to take advantage of 
communication or knowledge gaps between outside actors.73 
• Recommendation 3: The Department must engage in contingency planning for consent-
based crises, especially in situations where host state consent is likely to be an issue. Not 
only will this prepare DPKO for dealing with restrictive circumstances, but it will move 
consent-based issues to the front of preparatory discussions, thus making the host state 
aware of the UN’s preparedness and deterring attempts to constrain operational activities. 
 
Policy Recommendation 1- Explicit Incentives for Cooperation and Consent 
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations must present explicit incentives for 
cooperation and consent rather than approach the host state with these options once it has already 
placed restrictions on the mission. In order to create an environment of positive reinforcement 
for cooperative behaviors rather than uncooperative ones, DPKO needs to compile a list of 
quick-impact projects, infrastructural work, and additional development projects that a mission 
would be capable of accomplishing over the course of its time on the ground. This list of 
potential improvements could then be presented to a country alongside a benchmarked timetable 
prior to mission deployment. As improvements in the security and political situation were made 
and the cooperation of the host state was maintained over time, these projects could be 
implemented to encourage continued consent for the mission and enable consistent progress 
towards the success of the mission. Among other things, this strategy would work towards 
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addressing the challenge of obsolescing will, as the state would continue to receive material 
gains for its cooperation with the PKO over time and see the value of sustained UN involvement. 
If UN incentives are going to be useful, they must be explicitly named long before a 
government begins to withdraw its consent. Once a government has already begun to constrain 
the mission operationally, applying leverage in the form of a “bonus” only reinforces the state’s 
uncooperative behavior. Incentives for cooperation must be differentiated from bribes for 
rhetoric; if incentives do not promote operational as well as strategic consent, then the incentive 
is not only ineffective but also makes poor use of vital UN resources and finances. As this paper 
discussed in the case in Chad, the UN’s proposal of various infrastructural projects to hold the 
consent of the Chadian government was only successful in maintaining strategic-level consent 
for the mission rather than encouraging operational consent and cooperation. In other words, the 
UN purchased the Chadians’ rhetorical support at the cost of roads and an air hangar but wasn’t 
allowed any additional freedoms that might have benefited it on the ground.  
Johnstone recommends not only the use of quick-impact projects to sustain consent but 
also “peacebuilding assistance” for cooperative governments.74 As the Peacebuilding 
Commission (PBC) gains in legitimacy and effectiveness, this option will become increasingly 
viable as an incentive for cooperation. Thus far Liberia has been the only country to be taken on 
by the PBC while a peacekeeping mission is still on the ground; this trial run could be the first 
step in progressing towards more coordination between peacekeeping missions and the PBC, 
thus strengthening the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. 
Though it may seem counter-productive or unfair to withhold development projects or 
peacebuilding assistance where countries are being uncooperative, this is a necessary step that 
the Department needs to be bold in taking. The support and cooperation of the host state is 
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necessary for these projects not just to facilitate completion, but also to make any kind of 
meaningful contribution to the peace or growth process of the country. These projects are 
unlikely to have any sustainable, positive effect on the country without governmental support, or 
at the very least without governmental tolerance, and as such should only be attempted in 
consensual, supportive environments. It becomes increasingly difficult to rationalize 
development projects in instances where the state in question is likely at any point to interfere 
with the mission’s activities or, as in Chad, expel the mission entirely. 
In addition, by being firm about the necessity of genuine host state cooperation, DPKO 
reasserts the tie between the strategic and the operational levels of consent and strengthens not 
only its own influence over the host state government, but also that of the Security Council and 
the UN as a whole. By using these projects as incentives for cooperation, the UN reinforces its 
cohesiveness and ties concrete consequences to a state’s operational restrictions of the mission. 
Fundamentally, DPKO needs to set a precedent for withholding assistance where states harass 
peacekeeping missions, not only to protect peacekeepers themselves, but also to assert the 
authority of the Security Council on the ground and safeguard the investment that Member States 
make in UN PKOs. 
 
Policy Recommendation 2- “Active and Supportive Diplomacy”75 
The development of incentives for cooperation does not need to lie only with the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, or even within the United Nations system. As one of its 
major recommendations for the reform process, “New Horizon” calls for a diplomatic support 
                                                
75 Op. cit., “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for Peacekeeping.” (United Nations: New York, 
2009). 12. 
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structure to back up peacekeeping missions on the ground.76 This is another key step in 
strengthening the connection between the strategic and the operational levels of consent, and it is 
apparent that these formal groups of interested parties could be useful for all peacekeeping 
missions, especially those where a strong central state makes it more likely that consent-based 
issues will be a concern. Johnstone argues that these “groups of friends” could play an important 
role in maximizing the leverage of the peacekeeping mission over time by “ensuring that 
‘difficult governments’ do not play multiple mediators and other external actors off against each 
other” as well as “engaging systematically with neighbouring countries that have the ability to 
either support or disrupt a peace process.”77 “New Horizon” further expands on the benefits of 
these groups for maintaining consent and sustaining international support for the mission on the 
ground. It finds that these “informal coalitions” can play an important role in advocating for the 
mission and retaining political support and resources.78  
In cases such as that in Eritrea, a group like this could possibly have reacted to the small-
scale, consistent operational restrictions placed on UNMEE before they had become so extreme 
as to force the termination of the Mission. A group such as this, consisting of other governments, 
NGOs, and interested parties, might also have been able to assist in circumventing the Eritreans 
by making the Mission less dependent on Eritrean logistics and resources, thus reinforcing 
UNMEE through non-UN channels in addition to UN ones. Keeping outside actors involved over 
the course of a mission’s lifetime reduces the host state’s ability to harass a PKO if the eye of the 
international community begins to look in other directions. A state government will find it more 
difficult to express its obsolescing will operationally when the major actors are consistently 
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Beck 42 
involved and communicating with each other as well as demanding the ongoing consent of the 
host state. While active, supportive diplomacy may not fully address a state’s decreasing will to 
cooperate over time, it can certainly slow the process by sustaining interest in the outcome of the 
mission and reinforcing the international community’s involvement.  
Ongoing diplomacy will also address the political position of the PKO vis-à-vis the host 
government. In situations like Chad, where the mission was isolated from the political process 
and formed a close relationship with the host state government to maintain consent, outside 
groups of actors could work to create space between the mission and the government, thus 
allowing the mission some autonomy within the diplomatic structure of the international 
community’s response and making it less beholden to the political whims of the government. In 
the context of peacekeeping missions, the lesson seems to be that isolation creates dependency, 
which is not a position that a PKO wants to find itself in. By keeping other actors involved and 
communicating, DPKO can ensure that the PKO on the ground is not the only voice heard by the 
host state, especially as the operation continues over time. 
To temper this recommendation, however, it must be noted that the first and most 
powerful diplomatic structure in the formulation and implementation of a peacekeeping mission 
is, and must remain, the UN Security Council. In its recommendation for informal support 
groups, “New Horizon” stresses that “the Secretariat can assist, but cannot replace, the leadership 
of the Security Council in generating and maintaining such support [for peacekeeping 
missions].”79 This is an important point for peacekeeping policy; DPKO cannot directly enforce 
the Security Council’s authority but must instead develop policies that will support the mission 
on the ground even in the event of limited Security Council leadership. Diplomatic structures 
outside the Council must be available to DPKO to address the gap between the strategic and 
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operational levels of consent but this can never be seen as a sufficient replacement for the 
authority of the Security Council. Nevertheless, formal groups of interested parties can be a 
powerful tool for maintaining consent over times and ensuring the continued authority and 
freedom of the mission. 
 
Policy Recommendation 3- Realistic, Consent-Centered Contingency Planning 
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations must consistently engage in contingency 
planning for consent-based crises, especially in situations where host state consent is likely to be 
an issue. DPKO has fallen short when it comes to planning in many past missions, but 
improvement on this score has been identified as a key goal by “New Horizon”80 and 
contingency planning for consent-based issues fits well into this department-wide objective. The 
principle that the issue of obsolescing will points to—that governments are better able to assert 
their decreasing will for UN presence as they become stronger—allows DPKO to predict which 
governments are more likely to raise operational challenges early on based on the initial strength 
of the government.  
Regardless of whether the Department thinks about consent in these precise terms, it is 
rare that consent-based issues come as a surprise to peacekeeping missions on the ground or to 
the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) at UNHQ. In light of this fact, it is difficult to account 
for the lack of tools PKOs have for dealing with uncooperative governments; this deficit must be 
attributed in some part to a lack of contingency planning. In Darfur, for example, it was apparent 
far before the Mission was established that the GoS was unfriendly to the idea of outside 
intervention, and the GoS reinforced this stance with continual and increasing restrictions of 
UNAMID that have continued until this day. While the Mission attempted to come up with 
                                                
80 Ibid., 13. 
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various ways of overcoming governmental restriction and has tried to work around the 
restrictions as best it can, there was a major oversight in not anticipating and addressing the need 
for strategies to maintain operational consent in the face of such an assertive government.  
There seems to be a tendency in the Department to avoid planning in order to keep from 
creating self-fulfilling prophecies, but this argument holds little sway with consent-based issues. 
It is imperative that DPKO overcome what appears to be a fear of contingency planning and 
recognize potential mission needs in situations where strategic or operational consent for a 
mission has been suddenly withdrawn. The purpose of consent-centered contingency planning 
would be to enable a mission to either adapt quickly to an environment of increasing restriction 
or to prioritize objectives in the case of withdrawn strategic consent. Rather than encouraging 
withdrawn consent, in-depth contingency planning would show host states that peacekeeping 
operations cannot simply be thrown out when the host state thinks they are done or is unsatisfied 
with the mandate. Knowledge that the mission has a plan to enact when operational restrictions 
are introduced will make host states less likely to impose those restrictions, or will provide the 
mission with immediately available options for action if such a withdrawal does occur. Even in 
situations where the restriction of the mission has been negotiated, as in the case of humanitarian 
emergencies like that in Darfur, in-depth contingency planning can still serve to equip a mission 
with strategies to protect itself against some of the most restrictive challenges presented by the 
host state and free up room for itself in the peace process. 
Beyond the practical applications, consent-centered contingency planning can also serve 
a normative function to force a state’s frustration with a peacekeeping mission out of the 
operational realm and back into strategic-level channels. If the ability of the host state to blow 
off steam through operational restrictions of the PKO is limited by the mission’s pre-planned 
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strategies, this will reinforce the connection between the strategic and operational levels of 
consent by pressuring the host state to recognize its own operational consent as synonymous with 
its high-level strategic consent. Contingency planning will also strengthen the strategic-
operational tie within the UN structure, as strategic level thinkers will be forced to take into 
account practical aspects of the mission’s situation on the ground, and the nature of the host state 
itself, when constructing a peacekeeping operation. Most importantly, planning is an activity that 
is not dependent on the host state; having a well-known contingency plan for situations of 
withdrawn or restricted consent will free up the mission politically, as it will not be held hostage 
to the attitude of the host state to the extent that it is when it is dependent on the government.  
Contingency planning is perhaps the most important of these recommendations, as it 
enables PKOs to address all of the above-stated challenges to host state consent: it uses the 
concept of obsolescing will as a basis for predicting where consent-based issues are most likely 
to occur and adequately prepare those missions for that likelihood; it provides readily available 
options and strategies for peacekeeping missions in situations, like the humanitarian emergency 
in Darfur, where the influence and independence of the mission has been negotiated away prior 
to deployment; it addresses the gap between the strategic and operational levels, not only for the 
host state, but also within the UN structure; and finally, it creates political space for the mission 
so that PKOs are not caught between pleasing the host state government and fulfilling their 
mandates own. It is vital that consent-based issues are seen as a possibility in every case and a 
mission contingency plan is created accordingly. 
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Conclusion 
Loss of either strategic or operational consent for peacekeeping missions is of concern for 
DPKO not just from the perspective of the UN’s role in the world, but also from a practical 
standpoint. From a peace and security perspective, peacekeeping missions save lives and play an 
impartial role in the stabilization and development of volatile countries, which benefits 
neighboring countries, citizens, and global security as a whole. But consent is also an important 
issue from a financial viewpoint. UN peacekeeping is the cheapest method for providing 
international political and military support to struggling states, and it remains an investment that 
Member States and the United Nations must decide to make in each individual situation.  
The United Nations and its Member States have an interest in ensuring that the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its supporting structures have viable strategies for 
maintaining not only formal consent but also the concrete operational consent and cooperation of 
the host state government. By enacting strategies that incorporate explicit incentives for 
cooperation, on-going supportive diplomacy for missions, and practical, consent-centered 
contingency planning for all peacekeeping operations, DPKO can equip itself for dealing with 
the most serious challenges of maintaining host state consent.  
States agree to forfeit aspects of their sovereignty when they accept a peacekeeping 
mission; this does not grant them the option of voiding that agreement unilaterally or without 
consequences. This may make strong governments less likely to accept peacekeeping missions 
on their territory, but in situations where the government is likely to constrain both the physical 
and the political freedom of the operation, it is perhaps better that missions not be established in 
the first place. As with all DPKO policy, it must be recognized that the primary responsibility for 
determining situations where peacekeeping operations will be successful falls to the Security 
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Council. However, the Secretariat must recognize that it will often operate in sub-optimal 
circumstances, and as such it needs practical answers for the questions that are raised by host 
state consent, which are likely to continue to be an issue in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. The cases discussed here show the need to strengthen the UN’s ability to assert itself 
so that it has options to protect its reputation as an effective and efficient promoter of 
international peace and security.  
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